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THE STATUTE OF USES AND SOME OF ITS IMPORTANT EFFECTS
BY ROBERT N. CONNERS
In the early part of the sixteenth century in
England there existed a practice on the part of land-
owners of conveying their land for the use of someone
other than the feoffee. The procedure generally fol-
lowed consisted of a transfer of the legal title to a
feoffee and a promise by him that he would allow whom-
ever the feoffor indicated to have the possession and
enjoyment of the land. The person entitled under this
agreement to the benefits of the land was known as the
"cestui qui use" and was often the feoffor himself. It
is commonly believed that these uses first started in
the fourteenth century as a means of avoiding prohibi-
tions against the ownership of land by religious organi-
zations. An owner of land who wanted a monastery to
have it found that he could accomplish this purpose, at
least to some extent, by enfeoffing a neighbor with the
land and exacting a promise from him that it be held
for the use of the monastery. Landowners soon found
that they could avoid other restrictions and burdens on
titles to land by means of uses. A landowner could
save his heirs from the feudal incidents of descent by
conveying to a friend for the use of his heirs, he
could get around his lack of power to devise real pro-
perty by conveying to the use of persons that he would
designate in his will, and he could escape forfeiture
for treason by enfeoffing another to his own use be-
fore he began a treasonable escapade that might lead
to forfeiture. The feudal burdens and disabilities
related only to the holders of legal title. For this
reason the rights under a use could not be forfeited
nor could uses be charged with other feudal burdens
incident to the legal title.
Uses were not recognized by the law courts and
so the cestui qui use could not enforce his rights in
courts of law, but had to depend on the good faith of
the feoffee. When these uses were first made for the
benefit of religious organizations. they were enforced
by exercise of the Church's powerful hold on the minds
of the people. A properly injected threat from Church
officials was in most cases sufficient to curb an in-
clination to ignore a promise made to hold land for the
benefit of a Church or monastery. There was no real
means of enforcing uses made for other purposes until
the Chancellor, as keeper of the King's conscience, re-
cognized that it was unjust for a feoffee who had pro-
mised to hold land for the benefit of another not to
keep that promise. It gradually became established pro-
cedure for a cestui qui use to appeal to the Court of
Chancery for enforcement of his use and for this Court
to apply the threat of imprisonment against the feoffee
to uses to force him to keep his promise. As uses be-
came even more popular as means of conveying the bene-
fits of land. By 1535 much of the land in England was
held for the use of someone other than the holder of
the legal title. The Chancellor by this time had
reached the position of enforcing uses against all but
purchasers of the land for value and without notice of
the promise. Since these promises could be oral and
even secret, it is obvious that they caused much uncer-
tainty as to titles to land.
In order to restore the sources of revenue lost
by avoidance of feudal obligations and to prevent fur-
ther confusion resulting from secret uses King Henry
VIII got .the statute of 27 Henry VIII enacted in 1536.
This act, commonly called the Statute of Uses, provid-
ed in substance that when A is seised to the use of B,
then B should be deemed the owner in law with seisin
and possession of a legal interest of the same size as
that given for his use. It is important to notice that
the Statute did not attempt to prevent the creation of
uses or to change the methods of creating them. It
simply provided that when a use was created, the seisin
and possession would pass to the cestui qui use. The
reasons for the enactment of the Statute are clear. The
Statute itself is simple and easily un-derstood. Never-
the less when applied in conjunction with established
laws concerning real property, the Statute of Uses re-
sulted in many important and frequently confusing con-
sequences.
EFFECT OF THE STATUTE ON THE TRANSFER OF LEGAL INTERESTS
Until 1536 po.ssessory freehold interests could be
transferred directly only by feoffment. This required
livery of seisin, which involved a symbolic delivery of
possession with both parties actually on the land. A
term of years could be transferred by an oral lease and
entry by the lessee, and the non-possessory interests of
reversions and vested remainders could be passed by
sealed deeds of grant. The device of lease and release
was a possibility before the Statute an'd did allow a
transfer of a possessory fee without livery of seisin.
In this transaction the transferror would first lease to
the transferee for a term of years; theu, after the
transferee had reduced the transferror's interest to a
non-possessory reversion by entry on the land under the
lease, the transferror could release his reversion to
the transferee by deed. Notice however that it was
necessary for the transferee to enter by right of his
lease before the transferror could be in a position to
make a release. Until the transferee entered, the trans-
ferror continued to have a possessory freehold interest
which could not be transferred by deed. Hence it ap-
pears that before the Statute a conveyance of a posses-
sory freehold required entry on the land by both the
parties, as in feoffment, or at least entry by the trans-
feree, as in lease and release. Two other methods of
conveyance, fine and recovery, were used only in certain
instances and were cumbersome and time consuming. In
general, a conveyance before 1536 required actual deli-
very of possession to a transferee.
The Statute did not displace any of the existing
methods of conveying land. It was still possible after
the Statute to transfer land by feoffment or lease and
release, but where these methods were used, it was nec-
essary to guard against resulting uses. Before the Sta-
tute it had been so common for the feoffor to keep the
use for himself while enfeoffing another with the land
that it was presumed that in any conveyance the use re-
turned to the feoffor unless it was specifically men-
tioned or unless consideration had been given. This
presumption continued after the Statute and in so far
as the use came back to the transferror, the Statute would
operate on the resulting use to give the transferror a
legal interest. This could be prevented by stating who
should have the use.
After the Statute it became possible to transfer
the legal estate of the transferror by the appropriate
common law method to another to the use of th-e transferee.
After 1536 the Statute of Uses would act on this transca-
tion to carry the seisin given to the transferee to uses
on to the cestui qui use and vest him with legal title.
For instance, if A should enfeoff B and his heirs to the
use of C and his heirs, C would immediately, by force of
the Statute, have legal title in fee simple and B would
have n'othlng. Before the Statute B would have had the
legal title and C only the equitable title, a right in
Chancery against B. Another example is the dase in
which A enfeoffs B and his heirs to the use of A for.
life, remainder to C and his heirs. -Here the Statute
would put a legal estate for life in A with a legal in-
terest similar to a remain'der in C, while B would again
have no interest.
Anothe.r method of transferring the legal title
produced by the Statute was based on the practice of
the own-er promising to stand seised to the use of an-
other without transfer of the legal title to anyone. It
had been common practice before the Statute for one per-
son to "bargain and sell" the use directly to another*.
This was in effect a promise by the owner that he would
stand seised to the use of the other. The Chancellor
would enforce such promises only if it could be shown
that there was consideration for the owner's promise.
While it had been easy to charge. the conscience of a
feoffee to uses with the obliga.tion to carry out his
promise, the Chancellor felt that unless the owner had
been paid, he should not be forced to keep a promise to
make a gift of his land. Before 1536 if A were to bar-
gain and sell his land to B, A would retain his legal
fee and B would have only the personal right against A
in the Court of Chancery. After the .Statute a valid
use arising from a bargain and sale transaction would
be changed to a corresponding legal estate in the
grantee, and B would immediately have title to the legal
interest corresponding to the use sold.
A third type of conveyance, which developed after
the Statute, was the so-called "covenant to stand
seised." This differs from a bargain and sale only in
that the promise must be by a sealed inst-rument and the
consideration must be relationship by blood or marriage,
rather t-han money.
The new methods of bargain and sale and covenant
to stand seised enabled an owner of land to pass a pos-
sessory freehold interest in land without an actual de-
livery of possession. The Statute itself acted to
transfer the legal title and possession according to
the promise without any further action by the parties.
To preserve the secrecy of their conveyances and
to avoid the fees required by the Statute of Enroll-
ments, which was enacted shortly after the Statute of
Uses, landowners developed an additional technique for
conveying land, combining one of the new methods with
one of the old. This consisted of a bargain and sale
for a term of years followed immediately by a deed of
release. Here the Statute of Uses would carry the legal
possession of the term directly to the transferee with-
out the necessity for an entry, and the release would be
effective immediately. The Statute of Enrollments re-
quired the enrollment only of a bargain and sale of a
freehold interest. Here the bargain and sale was only
for a term of years and the freehold reversion was trans-
ferred by a deed of release; hence the Statute of Enroll-
ments was neatly evaded.
EFFECT OF THE STATUTES ON THE CREATION OF FUTURE INTEREST:
The only non-possessory freehold interest that an
owner of land could create in another before 1530 was a
remainder. A remainder could be either vested or contin-
gent, a vested remainder being a present estate in the
land with the right to possession postponed until a fu-
ture time and a contingent remainder being merely a pos-
sibility of becoming a vested estate. A remainder is
contingent either when the identity of its owner remains
uncertain or where the right to possession depends upon
the happening of a condition other than the expiration
of the preceding estate.
A limitation must have certain qualities to create
a remainder. It is necessary that a preceding estate of
freehold be created at the same time as the remainder is
created and that the remainder become possessory on the
expiration of the preceding estate. As a general rule it
had been impossible to create a freehold estate to become
possessory in the future, since freehold interests could
not be conveyed without an immediate delivery of posses-
sion. However, the courts reasoned that if a possessory
freehold were created, the feoffor could give seisin to
the possessory tenant not only for the possessory inter-
est conveyed to him but also for non-possessory interests
for others. Hence it was possible for a landowner to
to create a present estate of freehold, such as a life
estate, and at the same time provide for another estate
to become possessory on the termination of the first,
tenant not only for his estate, but also for the remain-
der. On the expiration of the life estate the seisin
would "remain" for the holder of the second estate.
Since only the transferee of a freehold estate could re-
ceive seisin, which is the legal possession of a freehold,
the preceding estate was necessarily at least a life es-
state. What migh.t be called an exception to this rule
existed in the creation of a vested remainder where a
term of years was given to the first tenant and livery
of seisin was made to him as agent for the remainderman.
In this case the seisin went directly to the remainder-
man., and the tenant held his term under him. Because of
the rule that seisin had t'o be in someone at all times
in order that the feudal obligations connected with sei-
sin would be enforceable, it was necessary also that the
second estate become possessory immediately on the ter-
mination of the first. If there were a gap in time be-
tween possession of the two estates, the *seisin of the
land would automatically go to the owner of the fee and
could be transferred from him only by another physical
delivery of possession. If by the terms of the limitation
the second estate could not become possessory until a
time after the expiration of the first, the seisin trans-
ferred by the livery would be interrupted and the limita-
tion of the second estate would be invalid. Another re-
striction on the creation ofremainders was that they
could not be made to take effect in derogation of the
proceding estate. The courts reasoned that to the extent
that the seisin was given to one it could not be shifted
to another by force of the original livery. Consequentl'y
a limitation. that would cut short a prior estate and
sh-If't it to another was void. Thus it appears that be-
fore 1536 the only estate that could be created in an-
other to become possessory in the future was a remain-der,
that to create a remainder a present estate must be creat-
ed at the same time, and if the remainder is contin-gent
the present estate must be a f.reehold; that it must be
limited to become possessory at the end of the preceding
estate, and that it cannot be limited to become possessory
in derogation of the preceding estate.
Since uses before the Statute were equitable in'ter-
bsts, separate fro the legal possession or seisin of the
land, they could be created free from the restrictions on
transfers of seisin. When the Statute of Uses transformed
uses to legal estates, it made possible the creation of
legal non-possessory or "future" in-terests in land of *the
same types that had been en'forceable only in equity before
1536.
Before the Statute there were two main types of non-
possessory interests created by uses. Springing uses ex-
isted in cases in which an owner of land conveyed the use
of his land to another, the use to become possessory at
a future date or on the happening of a condition. The
Chancellor would enforce such a use against the trans-
ferror when the time came for the use to become posses-
sory. The second type of future equitable interest was
called a shifting use. Here the use was made to shif t
from the one to whom it was first given over to another
on the happening of a condition. An example of this is
a bargain and sale by A to B and his heirs, but if a
certain event occurs, to C and his heirs. The Chancel-
lor would enforce the use of B against A until the con-
dition happened; then he would enforce C's interest.
After 1536 the Statute made limitations which could
not be remainders effective as springing and shifting
uses. Thus if A were to bargain and sell his land to B,
to become possessory on B's marriage, A would retain the
fee until the condition happened, at which time the Sta-
tute would take the seisin from A and put it in'B. Since
the Statute itself acts to transfer possession of the
land when the use becomes possessory, it is no longer
necessary fo.r A to make a physical transfer of posses-
sion. In the example of a shifting use, where A bar-
gains and sells to B and his heirs, but on condition to
C and his heirs, the Statute would put the seisin in B
immediately on the execution of the transaction. On the
happening of the condition it would take the possession
and legal title from B or his heirs and shift it to C
and his heirs. By making springing uses legal estates,
the Statute made possible a grant of a legal future in-
terest without a preceding estate of any kind, and by*
acting on shifting uses it allowed a grantor to provide
that a granted estate could be terminated by condition
and shifted to another person.
